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In biology and philosophy of biology, discussing the notion of interaction leads to
an examination of interactionism, which is, broadly speaking, the view that rejects
gene-centrism and gene determinism and instead emphasizes the fact that traits of
organisms are always the result of genes and environments. It has long been asserted
that the nature-nurture problem requires an interactionist solution of sorts, the so-called
interactionist consensus. This consensus, however, has been deemed insufficient and
challenged by several authors triggering an extension of the debate among contestants
and defenders. Unfortunately, part of the problem is that the views on causation
that would ground claims about interactionism are not always made explicit in this
debate, which renders those views somewhat complicated to assess. Moreover, it
seems to be assumed that causal complexity excludes the possibility of characterizing,
distinguishing, or comparing among causal contributions. By turning to a detailed survey
of the origin of the debate and to some developments in the philosophy of causation,
we will contend that this view is unwarranted, and that much of the debate around
interactionism is based on the drawing of this (wrong) conclusion. We also examine
implications of this analysis for the project to develop a framework based on the notion
of inter-identities.
Keywords: interactionism, causal parity, causal selection, nature-nurture, inter-identities
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION: BIOLOGICAL
INTER-IDENTITIES
This paper responds to the challenge posed by the Research Topic “Inter-identities’ in Life, Mind,
and Society” which the call for papers (CfP, 2019) identifies as the “struggle to understand and
model complexity in the living, the cognitive and the social domains” since the systems exhibiting
such complexity are thought not to be easily amenable to “classical analytic and reductionist
approaches.” The alternative we are urged to explore in this special issue amounts to being able to
account for those systems in terms of their “interaction with other systems and the environment.”
We attempt here to simultaneously reveal and warn against the potential and latent unawareness
about the issues, difficulties and debates that haunt such an alternative.
In biology and philosophy of biology, discussing the notion of interaction leads to an
examination of interactionism, which is, broadly speaking, the view that rejects gene-centrism and
gene determinism and emphasizes the fact that traits of organisms are always the result of genes and
environments. It has long been asserted that the nature-nurture problem requires an interactionist
solution of sorts.
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There is an ongoing debate around interactionism with a
somewhat dizzying dialectics. First, it is not very clear who the
opponent of interactionism really is. This should be evident from
the moment that many refer to interactionism as consensus view,
“the interactionist consensus.” Moreover, whilst there are some
who share the spirit of interactionism, they hold the belief that it
falls short of overcoming fundamental issues and an alternative
perspective is required. These often regard themselves as critics
of interactionism and adopt different names (here, we will call
this the “post-interactionist” trend). There are also objections
against those claims that interactionism is “enough,” that is,
criticisms against criticisms of interactionism that seek to restore
the interactionist stance.
There are important meta-problems surrounding the nature-
nurture debate. There are complaints that there seems to be,
as a matter of fact, an interactionist consensus that almost
nobody challenges but which seems to be still poorly understood.
Evelyn F. Keller neatly identifies a problem in the debate
(Keller, 2010, p. 1). She has pointed out that one of the most
remarkable features of the nature-nurture debate is how often
it drives us into two apparently contradictory outcomes. One
is the repeated announcement that the debate has been solved,
precisely, through the general acquiescence that the answer
simultaneously requires both aspects, whilst the other is the
persistence of the discussion, nonetheless.
Other authors have also confronted previously this
paradoxical situation of the (dis)solution of a problem that
comes back continually and have been forced to make an effort
of clarification in order to show that, though they propose
to overcome the debate along these lines, the mere appeal to
interaction, just a plain “both are necessary,” without any further
development or precision, does not simply leave the problem
unresolved but rather contributes to its perpetuation.
In this paper, we analyze various views and show that a
main concern across such views is causal, even when adequate
causal analysis is not usually invoked in the literature on the
topic. Indeed, the core of the problem around interactionism
is how to deal with causal complexity. Causal complexity is
characterized by what is sometimes called polygeny (Molnar,
2003), that is, the fact that effects are typically brought about
by multiple causes, and interaction, that is, the fact that causal
factors do rarely, if ever, contribute with independence from
other factors. Interactionism in general accepts this, but fails to
move beyond simple statements of this very kind. Unfortunately,
part of the problem is that the views on causation on which
claims about interactionism would be grounded are not made
explicit in this debate, which renders those views somewhat
complicated to assess. Moreover, it seems to be assumed that
causal complexity excludes the possibility of characterizing,
distinguishing, or comparing among causal contributions. By
turning to developments in the philosophy of causation, we will
contend that this view is unwarranted, and that much of the
debate around interactionism is based on the drawing of this
(wrong) conclusion.
Finally, we intend to examine to what extent the difficulty in
elaborating a substantive notion of interaction (interactionism),
beyond the mere appeal to the necessity of taking into account
diverse factors when trying to understand the organism, has any
implications for the project to develop the idea of inter-identity
in these and other fields. Our claim is that it does have such an
impact and that accordingly we cannot ignore the exigency to
cope with this in explicit terms in our theories and explanations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section “The interactionist
consensus” outlines the so-called interactionist consensus, an
alleged default view in biology and philosophy of biology.
Section “Objections to Interactionism and Post-interactionist
Alternatives” summarizes the main objections to standard
interactionism and outlines two alternative proposals:
Susan Oyama’s constructivist interactionism and Richard
Lewontin’s dialectical biology. Next, in section “Vindications
of Interactionism,” we address vindications of the standard
interactionist stance put forward by Philip Kitcher and Kenneth
Schaffner. The consideration of these views leads us into
debates on the philosophy of causation surveyed in section
“Discussion: Bringing the Philosophy of Causation to the
Debate,” where we make our case that the interactionism debate
in philosophy of biology tends to draw the wrong pessimistic
conclusion from the recognition of causal complexity. In
order to understand why and search for alternatives, first
sub-section “Clarifying the Original Confusion at Source of
the Debate” draws on Keller historical survey on the origin
and transformation of the debate and, then, sub-section
“The Problem of Causal Selection” frames her moral in
the general issue of causal selection, and finally sub-section
“Interactionism, Post-Interactionism, and Causation” briefly
introduces, respectively, epistemic and ontological options
to consider. Lastly, in section “Conclusion and Prospects
for the Project,” on the basis of our analysis, we draw some
conclusions and we discuss the implications of this work for the
Inter-Identities project.
THE INTERACTIONIST CONSENSUS
The interactionist consensus emerges in opposition to what is
perceived as tradition, characterized by an overarching gene-
centrism. In such gene-centric tradition, biological phenomena
pertaining both to evolution and to development can be
accommodated in a series of dichotomous categories:
Biological Cultural
Nature Nurture
Inherited, innate traits Acquired, learned traits
Internal causes External causes
Genes Environment
Where the gene/environment distinction in the table above
assumes a few other forms:
Genes Environment




. . . . . .
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Disease etiology provides a good example of the dichotomy
in action. Whilst some diseases are said to be genetically
determined, or innate (the terminology varying with context),
others are thought to be acquired, not determined genetically
(e.g., Huntington’s disease is classified as genetic, whereas type
1 diabetes is considered to be non-genetic). In a contemporary
setting, the dichotomic disease (etiology) classification does
not resist much pressure. Virtually any researcher would
acknowledge that genes “alone” cannot determine, cause,
produce, or generate anything, and that they never act alone.
Interactionism opposes genetic determinism of traits and a gene-
centric tradition in biology. In this sense, genetic determinism is
currently not a popular stance, and anyone would instead take
pride in being an interactionist. Interactionism is the position
that highlights the fact that traits of organisms are always
the result of genes and environments. While interactionism is
“boosted” by new empirical findings in cutting-edge fields, such
as epigenetics, it nevertheless emerged before and independently
of such recent achievements (Kronfeldner, 2009).
Notably, finding explicit and well elaborated characterizations
of interactionist views (let alone of a philosophical style) is not
an easy task1. This is perhaps precisely because it constitutes
“a consensus” (Schaffer, 2016), or a sort of default position
in contemporary research. It is clear, however, that a certain
smooth continuity holds between non-interactionist views (e.g.,
genetic determinism) and interactionism: the latter preserves a
strong dichotomous thinking (cf. Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999;
Kronfeldner, 2009). Even if the innate/acquired dichotomy no
longer seems to apply, as any trait is conceived as the result of
different kinds of factors, it is precisely these kinds of factors that
become a prominent and irreducible dichotomy. Indeed, the very
formulation of an interactionist stance rests upon the partitioning
of biologically relevant factors into genetic and non-genetic. This
constitutes an important line of objections to interactionism by
several authors who identify the dichotomous thinking as the
ultimate problem underlying much of contemporary research
and theorizing in biology. In the next section, we turn to
such criticisms.
OBJECTIONS TO INTERACTIONISM AND
POST-INTERACTIONIST ALTERNATIVES
In this section, we will outline the main objections raised
against traditional interactionism and the alternative (i.e., post-
interactionist) views they have motivated. We will consider two
such post-interactionist approaches: the so-called constructivist
interactionism and the dialectical biology view.
1We should make clear from the beginning that, when dealing with interactionist
views in the philosophy of biology (but not exclusively), the debate is not about the
causal roles of parts in (dynamic) systems and the ways to identify and distribute
their relative contributions to the performance of the whole system, but one about
the aggregated causal roles of the very systems themselves, which are allegedly
separated and, often, qualitatively different, in the production of an outcome (such
as genes and environment generating a particular phenotypic trait, in the canonical
case). We thank a reviewer for pointing out the importance of this clarification.
Interactionism as a Perpetuation of
Fundamental Dichotomies and Their
Asymmetry
As we advanced in the previous section, the interactionist
solution is regarded with suspicion. Post-interactionist
approaches target both traditional gene-centric evolutionary and
developmental biology, but also the more recent “interactionist
consensus” (cf. Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999; Kronfeldner, 2009)
that, in their view, falls short of correcting the former’s bad
habits. In that traditional view, which extends to contemporary
biology, biological form is to be explained, in a kind of regressive
manner, by pointing to a previous instance of form. Critics
denounce that, unfortunately, this kind of explanation is not
amended in regular interactionist replacements. This indictment
is evidenced in this very famous warning2 by Oyama:
“But wait,” the exasperated reader cries, “everyone nowadays knows
that development is a matter of interaction. You’re beating a dead
horse.” I reply, “I would like nothing better than to stop beating him,
but every time I think I am free of him he kicks me and does rude
things to the intellectual and political environment. He seems to be
a phantom horse with a thousand incarnations, and he gets more
subtle each time around. What we need here, to switch metaphors
in midstream, is the stake-in-the-heart move, and the heart is the
notion that some influences are more equal than others, that form,
or its modern agent, information, exists before the interactions in
which it appears and must be transmitted to the organism either
through the genes or by the environment. This supports and requires
just the conceptions of dual developmental processes that make up
the nature-nurture complex. Compromises don’t help because they
don’t alter this basic assumption” (Oyama, 2000), p. 26–27).
The point is that, in principle, interactionism considers such
a dichotomous view to be a mistaken one because, as we have
seen in section “The Interactionist Consensus,” it splits the
empirical world into unwarranted (if not arbitrary) realms but,
also, because it privileges one of the sides at the expense of the
other. What the post-interactionist authors to be introduced next
criticize is that, if interactionism arose as a corrective to the
faults of dichotomous views, its standard versions do not actually
achieve its goal. Their indictment is that interactionism leaves
those categories untouched specifically by not addressing both
the issue of how the allegedly interacting poles are defined and,
mainly, the remaining problem of attributing a privileged status
as essential cause to one of them. In their view this amounts to
perpetuating the dichotomous approach that interactionism was
supposed to supersede (Griffiths and Gray, 1994, p. 277).
Therefore, we have seen that interactionism has been widely
accepted as a response to traditional dichotomous views, but
objections extend to interactionism as well. According, for
instance, to Developmental Systems Theory (DST) supporters,
biologists and philosophers with “good manners” would call
themselves interactionists and stop looking for either the genetic
or the environmental origin of a trait. Rather, interactionists
would stress the mutual influence of genetic and environmental
factors and the more general nature/nurture debate would resolve
2This quote will gradually become the source of frequently repeated catchphrases
and several striking paper titles.
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in a quantitative way: “The question is no longer whether
intelligence is innate or acquired, but instead whether intelligence
is 50 percent or 70 percent genetic. DST rejects the attempt to
partition causal responsibility for the formation of organisms
into additive components. Such maneuvers do not resolve the
nature/nurture debate; they continue it” (Oyama et al., 2001, p. 1).
In this way, judged from a critical stance, interactionism
reinforces the mistake while seeming to correct it. In claiming
that all phenotypes are the joint product of genes and
environment, it retains all the opposing categories of the
tradition and partitions causal responsibility in a very biased
way: “two classes of developmental resources: genes and the rest”
(Griffiths and Gray, 1994, p. 277). Things interact, interactions
are important, but interactions necessitate distinct things that
interact. As an example of such a conservative way of thinking,
consider views that place information in loci other than genes,
e.g., in the environment. Information, whether in the genes or in
environments, still pre-exists, and it still presupposes two kinds
of information sources, genetic, and environmental. Thus, DST
places interactionism within the more traditional views.
Oyama’s Constructivist Interactionism
In contrast, Oyama is much more radical. The solution for her
is not to stress how nature interacts with nurture, how genes
interact with the environment or where information is located.
Oyama (and DST) calls the very distinctions above into question
and her view is therefore an attempt to do biology without such
oppositions. She seeks for a way of thinking about development
that does not rely on a dichotomous perspective, even implicitly,
because she does not accept pre-established and extant inter-
acting instances. This is why, lately, she and other proponents
of DST have assumed the label of “constructivist interactionism”
in order to differentiate themselves from a more standard and
flawed kind of interactionism.
In Oyama’s view this is centrally an issue about genetic
determinism. She thinks that genetic determinism is already
inherent in the way we (commonly) understand what genes are
and how they work, i.e., an understanding of them as containing
a pre-existing information. Thus, for Oyama, the solution to this
contemporary preformationism does not lie in opposing some
contemporary epigenetic approach. Neither preformationism nor
epigenetics were satisfactory in the past and will not be today. In
her view, then, we need a novel view of ontogenesis, in which
information is not pre-contained somewhere outside or inside
the organism ready to be used, but where information itself
develops, has an ontogeny, a developmental history. Information
neither pre-exists nor arises from disorder and chaos. This is why
DS theorists also claim that the nature/nurture debate is not dead
and explicitly reject the option to distribute causes and add them
up, as we have seen before (Oyama et al., 2001, p. 2),
Oyama and other DS theorists have advocated for the so-
called causal parity thesis, which has been formulated in various
ways. For instance, Oyama writes that she argues for “a view of
causality that gives formative weight to all necessary influences,
since none alone is sufficient for the phenomenon or for any of
its properties.” (Oyama, 2000), p. 15). In turn,
“There is a fundamental symmetry between the role of the genes
and that of the maternal cytoplasm, or of childhood exposure to
language. The full range of developmental resources represents a
complex system that is replicated in development. There is much
to be said about the different roles of particular resources. But there
is nothing that divides the resources into two fundamental kinds.
The role of the genes is no more unique than the role of many other
factors” (Griffiths and Gray, 1994, p. 277).
We will return to causal parity in section “Vindications of
Interactionism,” and particularly in sub-section “The Problem
of Causal Selection,” when we address interactionism from
the causal point of view. But first, we need to consider a
related approach.
Lewontin’s Dialectical Biology
A related but distinctive approach is that of Lewontin and Levins
(and collaborators). Through the years Lewontin (1982, 1983) has
developed a perspective founded on the mutual “construction” of
both the organism and the environment, instead of a lineal vision
consisting on the adaptation of an organism to a niche that is
taken as given, and has later rounded out it with the inclusion of
the gene within a triadic approach (Lewontin, 2000a: The Triple
Helix. Gene, Organism and Environment). Consequently, in this
last survey, both the relation gene-organism and the relation
organism-environment are equally questioned. Moreover, the
reexamination made by Lewontin of the three items included in
the title of his book puts them explicitly in connection with the
necessity to also develop an appropriate dialectics of “parts and
wholes” or, in other terms, with the necessity to relate levels of
organization and articulate what inter-level relations are and what
do they imply (Umerez, 1994, 2016).
A dynamic understanding of this framework of relations
amounts to the approach that Levins and Lewontin (1985)
identified as dialectical biology (1985), an approach that implies,
at least, the following tenets. First, the reconsideration of the
way to understand causes, which invites us to go beyond the
analysis of causes through linear models and reminds us that in
genetics and development we cannot truly partition the amount
of variation in a phenotype into different causes or treat several
causes as additive in the production of an effect. In this sense,
we cannot treat causes as independent and separable from each
other. Lewontin already said in his landmark article on the
analysis of variance and the analysis of causes that “[I]f an
event results from the joint operation of a number of causative
chains, and if these causes “interact” in any generally accepted
meaning of the word, it becomes conceptually impossible to
assign quantitative values to the causes of that individual event.
Only if the causes are utterly independent could we do so”
(Lewontin, 1974, p. 402). Unfortunately, the latter is not the case
in the biological realm.
Secondly, they warn us about certain assumptions that also
pervade interactionist perspectives and that tend to separate the
organism from the environment, not considering the effect of
the former on the latter, and to allocate ontological priority to
the individual over the collective (in human sociality) (Lewontin
et al., 1984, p. 270). A third aspect central to this view is
the necessity to incorporate explicitly an analysis of levels of
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organization and of the relations among those levels (Lewontin
et al., 1984, p. 277ff). Finally, a fourth aspect urges us to take
into account the impact of random effects on development
(developmental noise) (Lewontin, 2000a, pp. 17–18, 38).
Lewontin, in his “Foreword” to the new edition of Oyama
(2000), characterizes the “usual interactionist view” as asserting
that “there are separable genetic and environmental causes, but
the effects of these causes acting in combination are unique
to the particular combination,” a characterization he finds
unsatisfactory since it does not challenge “the ontologically
independent status of the causes as causes, aside from their
interaction in the effects produced” (Lewontin, 2000a, p. xiv).
This is why Lewontin, even if he thinks that Oyama’s analysis
of the ontogeny of information does indeed overcome such a
shortcoming, prefers to maintain a more clear departure: “It
is this claim about causes that Oyama, in this new edition,
calls “constructivist interactionism,” but that I would characterize
as dialectical in order to emphasize its radical departure from
conventional notions of interaction” (Lewontin, 2000b, p. xv).
VINDICATIONS OF INTERACTIONISM
In the previous section, we have summarized two representative,
and related, sorts of criticism to interactionism and we will now
present two equally representative answers to those criticisms
implying some kind of qualified defense of interactionist claims.
They are, moreover, two lines of response that enter in direct and
explicit discussion with those very criticisms.
The Heuristic Value of Post-interactionism
Philip Kitcher is a well-known critic of DST and related views.
He defends an idea of causal democracy while also vindicating
the genes/environment distinction and the value of heritability
analyses and the notion of a norm of reaction, which are built
on the basis of such a distinction. He takes on the conviction of
Lewontin and DST that genetic determinism is not as dead as it
might seem and that someone still needs to make the stake-in-
the-heart move (Oyama, 2000).
In a chapter with a rather flamboyant title (Kitcher, 2001)
contributed, precisely, to the second of two volumes published
in honor of Lewontin (Singh et al., 2001), Kitcher faces the
challenge of what he is going to describe as “both versions
of the transinteractionist3 approach” (p. 408). Starting with a
detailed analysis of the notion of norm of reaction, he disputes
both Lewontin’s and Oyama’s position and their criticism of the
conventional interactionist interpretation. In his view, there is no
fundamental error that explains the persistence of determinism
in biology, and thus there is no need for a reconceptualization
of parts of it, as Lewontin or DS theorists have suggested in
different ways. Rather, he thinks, it persists because biologists
misapply correct views.
He attributes biologists themselves a preference for simple
over complex explanations and a certain difficulty in explaining
3Kitcher uses the expression “transinteractionism” for what we call “post-
interactionism.”
complex science to the public. However, he admits that a
serious consequence of this inability is precisely the widespread
persistence of the idea of genetic determinism. He adds that,
therefore, he understands Lewontin’s and Oyama’s motivation to
call for a new approach. Nevertheless, he fears that the radicalism
of their indictment and alternative view helps to strengthen
genetic determinism rather than weaken it. He is also afraid
that it distances scientists from working efforts to explore non-
genetic factors.
Kitcher examines and opposes four main claims defended
by “trans-interactionists” (where he places Lewontin, Oyama,
Griffiths, Gray) against genetic determinism, three of which are
particularly relevant from the point of view of parity: (i) that
organisms and environments are inter-dependent, (ii) that there
is developmental noise in the production of phenotypes and this
undermines the partitioning of causes in norms of reaction, (iii)
that the singling out of genes against background environmental
conditions is a misguided abstraction from a complex causal
situation, and (iv) that the notion of a “gene for a trait” cannot be
coherently reconstructed. The third claim is very relevant here.
Since interactionists acknowledge that many factors intervene in
development, they support a principle of causal democracy:
Causal democracy: if the effect E is the product of factors
in set S, then, for any C ε S, it is legitimate to investigate
the dependence of E on C when the other factors in S are
allowed to vary.
This can be implemented by taking E to be a phenotypic
trait, C to be a particular genotype, and S to be a large set
of factors in the total environment. In this case, the principle
renders legitimate the strategy that investigates the dependence
of a trait on a genotype while allowing other factors to vary just
as much as it renders legitimate the strategy of investigating the
dependence of the trait on some environmental factor, allowing
the genotype to vary. Technically, the principle allows for various
ways of conducting causal analysis. But if this is the case, then
the principle gives no special privilege to representations that put
the role of genes at the forefront. But even more importantly,
and for the same reasons, the principle does not render norms of
reaction incongruent or illegitimate. In his view, “we can move on
from the blanket charge that any kind of separation out of causal
factors does violence to causal complexities of development”
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 404).
On the other hand, he advocates a pragmatic and pluralistic
stance that embraces a very rigorous and restrained use of every
technique that biologists have at hand, both because they are
helpful and valid to investigate, at least partially, well-formulated
questions and specific and very concrete issues (staying away
from easy and rapid conclusions) and because we do not have
other means (pp. 407–408). Referring to hypothetical different
set of models, he regrets that “neither Lewontin’s “dialectical
biology” nor the “developmental systems theory” pioneered
by Oyama offer anything that aspiring researchers can put to
work” (p. 408).
Oyama has protested in a detailed rebuttal explaining why
she thinks that Kitcher misrepresents both the positions of
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standard interactionism as well as those of its critics (Oyama,
2001, p. 179) but we will not follow this path. Instead, we
will now bring here another response that confronts directly
Kitcher’s skepticism about the prospects of critical approaches
to offer alternative but feasible avenues of research. Following
the trend for flamboyant titles, Griffiths (2006) supports Oyama’s
view that there is an inherent theoretical problem in the way
we conceptualize genes and, referring to her famous quote
mentioned above, he says that “[P]roof that developmental
information is not localized in the genes is the ‘stake in the
heart’ that will lay the vampire of genetic determinism to rest”
(Griffiths, 2006, p. 176). In order to argue for this claim, he
examines “the fallacious ways of thinking about genetic causation
that make up genetic determinism, considering that they are
the natural consequence of attributing semantic properties to
the gene” (pp. 177–189). Then, he adds data from an empirical
survey of biologists that shows “an apparent association between
endorsing informational representation of the gene and being
relatively uninterested in contextual effects on gene expression”
(p. 177, pp. 189–190). And, finally, he will try to prove
Kitcher to be mistaken by disclosing what he considers is “a
substantial research tradition in developmental psychobiology
that fits the prescriptions of developmental systems theory” (p.
177, pp. 190–192).
So, what is at stake is, on the one hand, the clarification of the
epistemological and sociopolitical implications of the concepts
and theories that are embraced by each approach (avoiding
potential misunderstandings) and, on the other, the assessment
of the heuristic and practical possibilities for research that they,
respectively, open up. The second response we bring to this work
directly addresses both of them.
An Empirical Defense of Interactionism
In a recent book, Behaving. What’s Genetic, What’s Not,
and Why Should We Care? (2016), Schaffner (2016) selects
Behavioral Genetics as the scientific research area serving
as assessment target for what he calls the developmentalist
challenge in “the discussion about genes and behaviors
and the nature-nurture controversy” (p. 2). In this book
Schaffner gathers together, and elaborates further, previous
work he had been producing over the years and which
has been published in scattered articles and book chapters.
Importantly for our purposes in this paper, the main thesis
of that book is that “. . . only by examining quite recent
work at the interface of molecular genetics, neuroscience,
and behavior can some of the controversies raised by the
developmentalist challenge be clarified, and at least partially
settled” (p. 74).
Addressing the two issues we have said were at stake here,
Schaffner offers us, on the one hand, elements to clarify potential
allegations of misunderstanding through a detailed analysis
of the conceptual tenets that, according to the author, most
(if not all) critics share regarding those previously mentioned
discussion and controversy. Such a detailed examination is built
stepwise through a careful characterization of 11 theses that
allegedly separate what he calls developmentalist (this is, our
“post-interactionist”) positions from traditional views (p. 2),
covering 7 “sins” about causation and 4 “mistakes” about the
nature-nurture relation4.
On the other hand, Schaffner offers a concrete way around the
challenge we have seen in the previous section concerning the
heuristics of the post-interactionist alternative by confronting
it against scientific practice in behavioral genetics, specifically
the work on the behavior of C. elegans, and psychiatric genetics.
He does so through the definition of 8 rules that connect genes
and behavior, which are derived from his survey of empirical
work carried out over the years on that model organism:
Eight Rules relating Genes (through Neurons) to Behavior in
C. elegans. Those general principles that allegedly govern the
relation between genes and behavior in C. elegans research are,
according to Schaffner, the following (pp. 82–93): many genes
→ one neuron; (ii) many neurons → one type of behavior;
(ii) one gene → many neurons (pleiotropy); (iv) one neuron
→ many behaviors (multifunctional neurons); (v) stochastic
[embryogenetic] development → different neural connections;
(vi) different environments/histories → different behaviors
(learning/plasticity, short-term environmental influence); (vii)
one gene → another gene . . . → behavior (gene interactions,
including epistasis and combinatorial effects); and (viii)
environment → gene expression → behavior (long- term
environmental influence). Schaffner indicates that the arrow (→)
can be read as “affect(s), cause(s), or lead(s) to” (p. 93).
Once the conceptual positions in conflict are unambiguously
specified and the general principles of a sensitive area of empirical
research are detailed, Schaffner proceeds to assess how well do
the classical and the developmentalist approaches succeed in this
confrontation. In other words, the very test or challenge posed by
Kitcher: “What do successful research programs in C. elegans area
tell us about the soundness and applicability of these concepts?”
(Schaffner, 2016, pp. 95–96).
In order to do that, Schaffner summarizes the 5 concepts
that he thinks are central to developmentalist approaches in
opposition and as response to the 11 theses that characterize
4He first details the Seven Deadly Sins of Causation, which are:
(i) the acceptance of the nature-vs-nurture dichotomy,
(ii) the principle that one gene causes one behavior,
(iii) the description of genes as blueprints,
(iv) the assertion that DNA sequences contain the essence of behavioral
information,
(v) the belief that genes cause behavioral traits fairly directly,
(vi) the idea that genes are the root cause of behavior, and
(vii) the view that a gene produces a single, clear, and specific phenotype (pp.
71–72).
These sins are coupled to Four Major Mistakes of Classical Approaches to Nature
and Nurture, including:
(i) the conviction that behaviors divide neatly into innate and learned classes,
(ii) the confidence that empirical studies can disentangle the effects of
heredity into specific percentages,
(iii) the consideration of analysis of variance (ANOVA) methods as powerful
tools that reveal developmental effects, and
(iv) the idea that a “heritability” is an excellent summary statistics (pp. 72–73).
The description of each one of these disputed theses is followed by the formulation
of the direct alternative or contrary view by the developmentalist approaches.
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traditional approaches (its seven deadly sins and four major
mistakes). Those five core concepts found in the developmentalist
challenge are: (i) Causal parity, in the sense that genes are on
a par with other factors: (ii) non-preformationism, denying that
traits are in any sense represented in the genes; (iii) contextualism,
assuming that genes have no meaning outside of a context
including other genes and encompassing circles of environment;
(iv) indivisibility, in the sense that the effects of genes and
environment cannot be distinguished in the traits, and (v)
unpredictability, claiming that not even a total knowledge about
genes and environment allows the prediction of traits (implying
their emergent nature) (pp. 95–98).
The final result is quite interestingly a mixed one showing,
on the one hand, that the extreme complexity of the relations
could render traditional approaches to genetic explanation
inadequate and, on the other hand, that some of the alternative
general principles are not always and completely satisfied either,
leaving ample space for more nuanced and intermediate research
strategies and conceptual explanations. Although he questions
the indivisibility and unpredictability theses, he accepts the causal
parity thesis:
“No C. elegans investigator ever thinks genes act alone (. . .)
Thus, causally, genes have parity with other molecules as severally
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (to produce traits), but
epistemically and heuristically, genes do seem to have a primus
inter pares status, even in an increasingly ‘epigenetic’ age” (p. 96).
DISCUSSION: BRINGING THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CAUSATION TO THE
DEBATE
Causal concerns run through the entire debate. As we have seen,
early views, such as Oyama’s, are committed to causal parity. The
dialectical view, in turn, has as one of its main tenets the idea that
the amount of variation in a phenotype cannot be partitioned into
different and separable causes. On the other hand, we have seen
that Kitcher’s criticisms against post-interactionists are partially
based on his claim that, if genetic determinism persists, it is
not so much due to actual views on genetic causation, which
are not flawed, but to simplifications of such views. Schaffner’s
examination of the post-interactionist thread is also centered
around causation, as he associates the thread with the “sins”
about causation that we have reviewed. As it is known, post-
interactionists endorse a thesis of causal parity; however, it is
interesting to note that critics of this tradition such as Schaffner
and Kitcher do not straightforwardly reject (some version of)
it. Indeed, Kitcher accepts the principle of “causal democracy,”
although for him this principle says less about the biological
phenomena than about the investigative strategies that scientists
are justified in following. And Schaffner also concedes that, in
C. elegans research, causal parity is admitted in principle –even
if genes are often privileged epistemically and heuristically.
Thus, the debate around interactionism leads us to discuss
issues in the philosophy of causation. One would expect the fuss
to originate from the lack of consensus with regard to how to
deal philosophically with complex causal relations in biology –
specifically, in what respects the joint occurrence of genetic and
environmental factors. Unfortunately, the views on causation
upon which claims about interactionism are grounded are not
made explicit in this debate. In this section, we contend that much
of the debate around interactionism is based on the drawing of
the wrong conclusion from causal complexity, that is, that causal
complexity excludes causal analysis.
As can be seen in the overview provided in previous
sections, it seems that many philosophers of biology are too
puzzled and pessimistic about polygeny in development. From
this, many of them draw what we think is an unwarranted
conclusion: that causal complexity excludes the possibility
of characterizing, distinguishing, or comparing among causal
contributions. Interestingly, this seems to be an issue common to
interactionism and post-interactionism alike: the two views fail to
go beyond very simple statements about single causes not being
sufficient to produce an effect, but readily subscribe to a thesis
of causal parity.
This conclusion, however, should be deemed highly
pessimistic: it condemns the entire philosophical project of
performing causal analysis of natural phenomena to failure,
to the extent that causal complexity is more of a rule than
an exception in the natural world. But, has anyone in the
interactionist debate provided solid reasons to endorse such a
pessimistic conclusion? We claim that they have not and, in the
next three sub-sections, we will try to argue why.
First, turning to Keller’s (2010) conceptual and historical
reconstruction, we will highlight the apparently (but not
truly) obvious relevance of clarifying epistemologically what is
originally at stake in the debate. Then we will expand the scope
in order to insert the postulates of the debate within the more
general issue of causal selection, where such an epistemic option
finds its rationale. Finally, we will explore the prospects a more
ontologically engaged approach could offer.
If our arguments in this section hold, in the last one, we will
conclude that a great deal of the difficulty involved in the debate
about interactionism stems from the wrong inference we have
identified, and we will extract some consequences for the project
about inter-identities (CfP, 2019).
Clarifying the Original Confusion at the
Source of the Debate
Let us return for a moment to Keller’s remark, mentioned
in the introduction, on the perdurability of the issue(s) at
stake here. Despite the discussions we have briefly depicted
using some representative positions and, allegedly, the resulting
clarification of the questions involved, Keller finds nevertheless,
and to her amazement, that the debate on interaction remains
practically the same (particularly in the wider public realm).
This, for the most part, simply restates the limitations of the
standard interactionist solution, as many critics have already
reminded us.
In short, the point is that any easily manageable notion
of interaction requires pre-existing causal factors that are
theoretically separable and this is precisely what we do not get in
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the complex and intricate processes leading to the development
of biological and behavioral traits (Keller, 2010, p. 6). This
should be just a logical point beyond debate: causes that are
not mutually independent and interact in such entangled ways
“simply cannot be parsed” (Keller, 2010, p. 75). But in fact, it is
not:
“If all that was at issue in the nature-nurture debate was a
comparison of the contributions of nature and nurture to individual
development (. . .) [critics] are of course correct: this question is
meaningless (‘we can’t readily separate one from the other’), and
the debate could indeed be said to be over. But unfortunately, the
question of what the nature-nurture debate is about is not so easily
settled” (Keller, 2010, pp. 8–9).
And, accordingly, the fate of interactionism as such is not
either. The reason for this is that not all the people are talking
all the time about the same, partcularly when we turn to scientific
practice. For instance, “. . . to population geneticists, the debate
is not about relative contributions to individual traits, but
about contributions to the variation within a population. Still
others think of it as being about the relative importance of
the contributions of nature and nurture to differences between
individuals” (p. 9, bold added).
This is why she states from the very beginning that the
problem lying at the core of the issue is that the very question
involved, “what is the nature/nurture debate about?” (p. 1),
is not a clear one but, instead, implies a variety of entangled
questions which are ambiguously posed. She adds that the very
language of genetics is particularly responsible for that situation.
She elaborates on these two qualifications in the meaning of the
debate, introduced in her quote above (moving “from trait to trait
difference” and “from individuals to populations”), through a
detailed historical review of the introduction and transformation
of the concepts of genetics. Since it helps us to establish the basis
of our argument we will briefly summarize the main points of this
historical survey.
First, we find the claim that seeing nature and nurture, genetics
and environment, as separate causal factors has a historical origin.
Keller traces back this separation, which might be at the root of
the problem, to the end of the nineteenth century, already with
Darwin and Spencer but more clearly then with Galton.
Keller locates at this moment the turn in the usage of the
phrase “nature and nurture,” which she has briefly traced from
Shakespeare to J. S. Mill and that, according to her (and other
scholars with whom she agrees), did not imply the sense of
opposition and separation that would acquire from then on. She
claims that it was only after Galton that the new connotation
became clearly established and that it was already entailed by
the re-signification of the notion of heredity that Darwin and
others are engendering. The turn involves three elements. One
is the aforesaid change in the notion of conceptions of heredity
that brought about a new alignment between innate (or inborn)
and hereditary. Another is the subsequent internalization and
substantiation of heredity. And the third is the introduction
by Galton of a particulate theory on inheritance that will
5See also Lewontin (1974) as introduced and quoted above (section “Lewontin’s
Dialectical Biology”).
accomplish the definition and instantiation of the separation
(Keller, 2010, pp. 20–27).
Having established this starting point, she then goes on
to explain the reformulation already made by Fisher at the
beginning of the twentieth century that will reveal, as early
as then, the source of the current clash or entanglement of
meanings. The tension would be that between Galton’s approach
to the new distinction and the more technical application of
it in population genetics. She thinks that clarifying how those
terms and concepts have been used and are used in (population
and developmental) genetics could help both to understand the
problem (why it is so resistant) and to reformulate when and how
the question might be meaningful.
“. . . Galton’s hope of sorting genetic from environmental influences
would need to be recast in two important ways. First, it was
necessary to reformulate the question of causation in terms of trait
differences rather than in terms of traits per se, and second, it was
necessary to turn form the analysis of heredity in individual lineages
to the analysis of heredity in populations. Only if we ask a statistical
question about the relative contributions of variations in genetics
and in environment to our differences–rather than their relative
contributions to the process that make us what we are–would we
have a question that makes sense, and furthermore, one that we
might be able to answer” (Keller, 2010, pp. 31–32).
The consequence of these distinctions is the possibility of
understanding why even if we are not able to parse the causal
contributions of genetics and environment to individual traits
we might still be able, in some cases, to statistically parse the
causal contributions of differences in genetics and environment
to differences in traits averaged over a population (Keller,
2010, pp. 12).
Nevertheless, she will review and bring up examples to show
how difficult it turns out to be, even for specialists, to keep up
these distinctions sharp, both in technical or popular science
discourse. This would, at least in part, explain the “unreasonable
persistence” of the debate: the root of the problem is inserted in
the very language of particulate genetics6. Even if the science has
changed, that is, genetics has become much more complex, she
claims that language has lagged behind, allowing those slippages
of meaning. This is a judgment, incidentally, that we could
extrapolate to other areas of research.
The interesting point for us here to reinforce the idea that
we have been developing in the previous sections: beyond, or
due to, the inseparability of factors implied by most of the
explanations resorting to the concept of interaction in biological,
behavioral and cognitive sciences, it is necessary to specify
if and when distinctions between causal factors can be made
under certain conditions (so rendering interaction an effective
epistemic resource).
6There is another very important point that may also in part explain such
persistence but we are not going to be able to pursue it here: “. . . the fact that (. . .)
the debate does seem to capture a number of issues that many people want to know
about” (Keller, 2010, p. 73). This opens up a very interesting analysis about the
concept of phenotypic plasticity and the possibilities of rethinking and expanding
the notions of inheritance and heritability, together with the social and political
issues such an undertaking raises (Keller, 2010, pp. 73–84).
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In order to achieve such disciplinary generality (i.e., to fulfill
the goal of our paper which is to offer some informed forewarning
to the attempts “to understand and model complexity in the
living, the cognitive and the social domains” in terms of
interaction) this requirement cannot be justified by merely
looking at a particular discussion in biology and the details of its
historical conceptual development (however decisive they are);
instead, a broader (causal) philosophical approach is required.
We should first take a quick look to the problem of causal
selection that allows us to move to this broader approach.
Such a frame helps us typify the option resulting from Keller’s
analysis as an example of how to make distinctions among causal
factors attending to epistemic needs or pragmatic choices. Once
we establish this, we can bring up the much more difficult
and pressing issue of whether we may attempt (and to what
extent) to go beyond and ground ontologically those differences
among causal factors.
The Problem of Causal Selection
As mentioned before, causal complexity is, to a great extent, due
to the fact that many (if not most) effects of interest are brought
about by a multiplicity of causal factors (i.e., are multi-causal
or polygenic). This is counteracted by the fact that, even when
we find that multiple factors are relevant for the occurrence of
a given phenomenon, we tend to treat a subset of those as the
cause or the causes of the phenomenon. The rest, we regard as
mere background conditions. Causal selection is this practice of
selecting certain factors over others. To use a classical example,
consider the lighting of a match. We accept that several factors are
relevant to the lighting of the match: the fact that Mary stroke it,
the presence of oxygen in the room, the dryness of the match, and
so on. Yet, in response to the question “What caused the match to
light,” we tend to pick Mary’s striking of the match as the cause.
Presence of oxygen and dryness are regarded as background
conditions. Such a selection practice is pervasive, both in the
sciences and in everyday life. In both everyday experience and
scientific investigation, we simply do not cite every possible factor
as causes of a phenomenon of interest, but instead select some of
them. Yet, as we said, both oxygen and the striking of the match
are relevant for the effect. Thus, the problem of causal selection
minds the grounds for discriminating between genuine causes
and mere background conditions, what is the nature of these
grounds, or whether the practice of causal selection is irreducibly
ungrounded (Broadbent, 2008; Franklin-Hall, 2015; Ross, 2018;
Baxter, 2019).
In this context, a view that is considered the consensus in
philosophy (e.g., Schaffer, 2016) is the one advocated by Mill
(1974 [1843]). Milleanism is the view according to which there
are no ontological differences between causes, and these only
differ ontologically from non-causes (Mill, 1974 [1843])7. Any
distinction between what we call a cause, and what we call a
7“Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction
between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the capricious manner
in which we select from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate
the cause. However numerous the conditions may be, there is hardly any of them
which may not, according to the purpose of our immediate discourse, obtain that
nominal pre-eminence” (Mill, 1974 [1843], p. 329).
background condition, responds exclusively to the interests of the
investigation (or to the interests of everyday causal judgments).
This view has more recently been contested. Indeed, many
have argued against Milleanism on the grounds that important
objective distinctions can and need to be drawn among causal
relations. Recent contributions claim that causal selection is
too consistent and systematic to be a merely pragmatic affair
(e.g., Hart and Honoré, 1985; Ross, 2018), and that the
mere fact of the multiplicity of causes does not imply that
they are ontologically indistinguishable (e.g., Waters, 2007).
Numerous attempts have been made to grasp the distinction
between causes and background conditions such as those
involving necessity/sufficiency considerations, contrasting and
counterfactual considerations, a notion of causal control, and/or
combinations thereof (Ducasse, 1926; Mackie, 1965; Broadbent,
2008; Ross, 2018, forthcoming).
In fact, this problem of causal selection constitutes the
angle from which some philosophers have argued —if not
against post-interactionism all together—against the causal parity
thesis. In the next section, we discuss such an argument and
use it to make our case that, as stated previously, much
of the debate around interactionism stems from drawing the
wrong conclusion from causal complexity, namely, that it




It is acknowledged, in the recent philosophy of causation, that
we often compare causes within certain domains and apportion
varying degrees of causal responsibility. The investigation
of such practices is an important philosophical project
for clear reasons. Often, one is not exclusively concerned
with detecting causal relations, but with the characteristic
features of particular causal contribution. The analysis of
the respects in which causal relations differ can be made
on the basis of several properties, for example, strength
or degree of the causal contribution, proportionality in
the grain of description for a causal structure, or stability
of the relation over a range of different background
circumstances (see Northcott, 2005; Braham and van Hees,
2009; Woodward, 2010).
This is indeed the point of view of a few philosophers
who opted to tackle questions of interactionism and the
nature/nurture debate from a strict causal angle, in particular,
through a discussion of the Causal Parity Thesis (CPT),
i.e., the uncompromising upshot of the principle of causal
democracy introduced above (section “The Heuristic Value of
Post-interactionism”). It has been noted that CPT expresses a
particular stance with regard to the problem of causal selection,
namely an extreme Millean exclusion of any relevant causal
distinction. Critics of causal parity argue on the contrary that
objective distinctions can be drawn which would ground the
view that factors are not causally on a par (Weber, 2005,
forthcoming; Waters, 2007; Woodward, 2010). Let us see briefly,
as a clarifying illustration, how the attribution of causal specificity
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in the case of DNA is argued for within the interventionist
approach to causation.
In particular, critics have invoked the concept of causal
specificity to make the case that DNA is ontologically different.
This concept has been spelled out in a few related ways. For
Waters (2007), it has to do with the possibility that many
different changes in the cause led to many different changes in
the effect. Woodward (2010) presents it as a matter of the grain
of influence or control that (idealized) interventions on a cause
enable over an effect. This is illustrated with a radio analogy that
compares the on/off switch to the tuning dial: there are many
possible positions for the dial, many possible radio stations, and
a relationship holding between both that enables a fine-grained
control over what is heard on the radio. I can intervene on the
dial in many ways so as to tune various different stations. By
contrast, the on/off switch, while causally relevant to whether a
station is received, has little influence on which one is received.
One cannot intervene on the on/off button in order to tune the
different stations, but only to turn the radio either on or off.
When causal relations have this property, they can be exploited
in various ways, allowing a fine-grained control of what happens
to the effect. Claims that DNA is a highly specific cause (or a
dial-like cause) of protein synthesis mean that: “there are many
possible states of the DNA sequence and many (although not
all) variations in this sequence are systematically associated with
different possible corresponding states of the linear sequences
of the mRNA molecules (. . .). Thus, varying the DNA sequence
provides for a kind of fine-grained and specific control over which
RNA molecules or proteins are synthesized” (p. 306). Claims that
the polymerase is not specific mean that interventions on it do not
provide fine-grained control. The role of the RNA polymerase, by
contrast, is switch-like.
The specificity argument against parity states that the
customary singling out of genetic factors in a large range of
causal explanations in biology does not simply follow from
the needs and interests of particular investigations, but it (in
addition) reflects some objective aspect of the world. Whilst
the reasons why we happen to be interested in inquiring
about the cause(s) of some effect rather than another might
well respond to all kinds of pragmatic and subjective reasons,
the same is not true for the investigation of the causes.
Once an effect has been specified, the question about its
causes is an ontological one, “fixed by ontology” (Waters,
2007). Waters argues that, similarly, once the causes of a
given effect have been identified, their characteristics (e.g.,
whether they bear a specific relation to the effect) are, too,
ontological ones.
We need to take stock from this discussion. The problem with
the literature on interactionism is that, while it revolves around
very general claims about causation, it is rarely made explicit,
if ever, which is the working causal-philosophical viewpoint. In
particular, it tends to ignore the problem of causal selection
and polygeny or is presented as an insurmountable issue that
resists any possible analysis. This contrasts with alternative
developments and points of view in philosophy of causation. In
our view, the debate will not move forward unless the philosophy
of causation is properly taken into account, be it to endorse
explicitly epistemic and pragmatic solutions or more demanding
ones, such as those that entail an ontological commitment.
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR
THE PROJECT
In the first part of this paper, we have examined the ongoing
debate on interactionism in the philosophy of biology. More
specifically, we have first presented the justification behind
the move toward an interactionist consensus. We have then
introduced a selection of the main concerns raised by post-
interactionists against the traditional interactionism that, in their
view, demand an alternative, perhaps stronger approach. Next,
we have also considered some representative views opposing the
claim that a different approach is needed and, in this sense,
vindicate a more standard form of interactionism.
The appraisal of the diverse positions on interactionism brings
us to the point where we cannot ignore the warnings of its critics
but, at the same time, we need to be able to face also a Kitcher-like
minimalist kind of defense:
“. . . for the present, the interactionist’s claim is simply that
we should not suppose that efforts to investigate the effects of
some factors, while others are allowed to vary, are incoherent or
illegitimate. Complex causal situations do not demand that we
perform the impossible feat of considering everything at once; rather
they challenge us to find ways of making these factors manageable”
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 404).
In the second part of this paper, we have brought this sort
of defense of interactionism under the light of discussions in
the philosophy of causation that, in our view, should be directly
tackled by those involved in the interactionism debate or those
willing to adopt an interactionist strategy in their research.
Even if the philosophical debate around interactionism as
such is still worthy of further discussion, and things are far
from settled, our analysis in this paper already allows us to
extract some valuable conclusions that could inform the various
efforts to develop models of “complex systems that comprise
“inter-identities” (CfP, 2019).
One first conclusion is that, when exploring “issues of identity
in biological, cognitive and social, biomedical, educational
and political systems” (CfP, 2019), we should not ignore
the implications of the nature/nurture controversy and its
accompanying debate on interactionism that has arisen in
evolutionary and developmental genetics (and elaborated
and pursued within the philosophy of biology), which we
have surveyed here.
A second one is that, in those areas of research, aside from
addressing the more substantial or empirical issues, an explicit
methodological and heuristic task has to be undertaken in each
instance and for every explanation or research purpose: to
identify and justify whether and how diverse causal factors are
going to be distinguished, whether and under what conditions
such causal factors are going to be parsed and how their mutual
relation is going to be accounted for. This is so because, to remain
within the limits of the so-called interactionism consensus,
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as a default and non-committed hollow stance, entails the
endorsement a Millean view on causality and, then, this heuristic
or pragmatic challenge becomes even more decisive. Setting
the conditions of possibility to obtain the epistemic benefits
granted by a heuristic stance (see Ferreira Ruiz and Umerez,
2018) becomes, therefore, the minimum requirement to be met
by any explanatory and research endeavor forced to incorporate
complex causal contributions that interact.
That said, a third conclusion is that we need not restrict
the discussion around interactionism and the nature-nurture
distinction to epistemic or pragmatic issues. Rather, this debate
can benefit from other philosophical projects, especially, in the
metaphysics of causation. In particular, we should not overlook
the issue on causal selection that we have shown to beset the
interactionist debate whenever multiple and complex causality
is involved. Accordingly, it would be advisable to disclose
and make explicit, as clearly and exhaustively as possible, any
causal selection decision and the underlying grounds for this
(be it purpose-specific or general, instrumental or ontologically
committed, conditional or unconditional). Similarly, when
addressing those debates in the philosophy of biology, we must
seriously consider the possibility of drawing various kinds of
distinctions among causal relations.
Finally, it must be noted that while it will still be the
predicament of every researcher to explore and determine how
far they can go in order to characterize an identity that is
developed in interaction, as a preliminary step, it will be necessary
to revise the assumptions around interaction and interactionism–
as we have attempted to do here. It will soon prove extremely
difficult to move forward in characterizing identity in interaction
if the interaction and joint contribution of multiple causal
factors is simply assumed to be an insurmountable obstacle to
causal analysis.
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